Peace by the end of 2008?

Two peace processes: Cyprus and Israel-Palestine 1/4
Nimrod Goren

Two intractable conflicts, distanced only 400 kilometers apart, are targeted for resolution by the end of 2008. On November 27, 2007, US President George W. Bush announced that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to "make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008". Four months later, on March 21, 2008, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat declared after meeting newly-elected President of the Republic of Cyprus Dimitris Christofias that "we want to solve the Cyprus problem as soon as possible. Our position is [to do that] by the end of 2008."

After years of stalemate, 2008 sees a renewed effort to resolve both conflicts. Almost mid-way through the year, though, it seems that should peace be reached by the end of 2008 it will more likely be shared by Turkish and Greek Cypriots than by Israelis and Palestinians.

The two conflicts have a long history dating back to the nineteenth century and are based on ethnic, religious and national rifts. Both focus nowadays on political realities shaped in recent decades--the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and the partition of Cyprus in 1974. Since, numerous attempts at resolving them have resulted in failure, most notably the 2000 Camp David summit and the 2004 Annan plan. These attempts touched upon core issues shared by both conflicts: recognition and self-determination, return of refugees, evacuation of settlements, land ownership, traumas and national symbols. However, the desired solutions for each conflict are entirely different. While the Israeli-Palestinian peace process aims at permanent partition in a two-state framework, the objective in Cyprus is to avoid such partition and to reunify the island under agreed-upon conditions.

Why is Cyprus in a better position to reach an agreement by the end of the year? Not only due to the extreme Israeli-Palestinian violence of recent years and to the current intra-Palestinian Fateh-Hamas feud. Pro-peace political leadership, public support for peace, and incentives for conflict resolution, which exist in Cyprus but are lacking in the Israeli-Palestinian context, are also vital features of a successful peace process.

Concerning political leadership, in Israel and the PA there is a leadership crisis. Both are led by leaders whose political faith is unclear, who suffer low levels of approval and political support and who declare their support for peace but engage in mutual-blaming for the lack of progress toward it. Greek and Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, seem to be led by two popular leaders who share long-lasting personal and ideological bonds, who were elected based on pro-peace manifestos, who aim to bring peace through an internal process and not one dictated by foreign powers and who have the ability to translate their commitment to peace into visible facts on the ground and cross-border confidence-building measures.

Turning to public support, despite ongoing activities by peace NGOs, Israelis and Palestinians are separated and lack exchange possibilities. Recent public-opinion polls show that a majority among them lacks belief in peace, thinks that the Olmert-Abbas meetings should be stopped, that a Palestinian state will not be established within five years and that their personal security is not assured. In contrast, Greek and Turkish societies include a strong pro-peace constituency with a genuine belief that peace is both desirable and feasible. The gradual opening of crossing points along the border enables more mobility and exchange between the sides and facilitates joint civil society endeavors that become widespread and assist in fostering a sense of mutual understanding and shared destiny.

As for incentives toward peace, the international community has not offered Israelis and Palestinians incentives that address collective needs and can transform conflict-oriented social beliefs and policies. The Arab peace plan is the closest to such an incentive. Current support for peace in Israel and the PA is mostly due to fear of a worse alternative. In Cyprus, the European Union membership that awaits Turkish Cypriots following reunification serves as a mega-incentive for peace. It secured Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan plan in 2004 and still is a major catalyst. Greek Cypriots do not enjoy such an external incentive and their support for peace includes a component of fear of a worse alternative--a Kosovo-like scenario in the northern part of Cyprus.

Prospects for peace in 2008 are higher in Cyprus. Yet a deal there is not within easy reach. A genuine attempt at resolving an intractable conflict requires a complex process of dealing with symbols and sensitive issues and willingness for historical compromises. Good will is essential for such a process, but it does not bring peace by itself. Israelis and Palestinians should follow closely as such a process takes place in the neighboring island. Lessons learned from there, together with local initiatives, innovative policy-planning and fresh leadership can bring peace to the Middle East. If not in 2008, then perhaps in 2009.

Nimrod Goren is a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Center for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is the executive director of the Young Israeli Forum for Cooperation.  - Published 15/5/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org