Amarji

Doing the Math!

The math of life deals more with cold logic than with complex calculations 

Further to Hammam's excellent argument below, I would like to point another problem with the math issue that gets often raised these days.

It goes beyond a doubt that when an America administration makes a mistake in calculations, whatever the reasons for that may be, more people get hurt around the world than when a regime like the Assads does. But looking at things from this perspective ignores an important fact, namely that American administrations are, in the final analysis, accountable to their people, while the same cannot be said of the Assads.

The main problem here, however, is that, because of America’s influence and standing in the world, as well as its complex and intricate interests, people from around the world, even those of developed countries, would want to see American administrations being held accountable to them as well. Since, however, we cannot all practically aspire to being American citizens, it seems that the only reasonable way to hold America accountable to is to work for the establishment of a fairer international system.

But this feat cannot be achieved by appealing to international principles and conventions alone, leveling the playing grounds in this regard requires reaching a comparable level of socioeconomic and political development. Contrary to popular lore in this regard, which is often reinforced by nationalist and Islamist ideologues, western powers are not standing in our way to achieve this, and might in fact be willing to aid in it, because more developed and sophisticated economies make better trade partners, as the ASEAN experiences prove.

Moreover, the success outside the region of our migrant communities, through both the traditional and more “liberal” components, argues against arguments of cultural and/or racial inferiority.

As the main obstacle in this regard cannot but reside with the ruling regimes and their partnerships with certain societal forces. Working to reform and change these regimes through the development of grassroots oppositional forces is, therefore, the first and necessary step towards the establishment of a fairer and more representative internationals systems. In order to make America more accountable to us, we have to make our own regimes more accountable to us. If Syrians want to oppose any conceived evil designs being implemented by any number of American and western politicians, that is fine, but the battle begins at home, against our own evil schemers and corrupt tyrants – the Assads and their ilk: they are not the lesser evil. Or, if one wants to think of them as such, then the more reason for taking them on first. For it makes more sense to take on the lesser contender before you take on the champion of the world. 

Of course, I am here subscribing to the argument that the West and America are evil, I am just saying that the unfairness of the international system is real, and that remedying this state of affairs requires a certain prioritization on our part: one that puts the struggle against local tyranny and corruption at the top of the agenda, one that seeks to establish on the grounds alternatives to the networks of tyranny and corruption in our midst (this is what the concept of reviving civil society is all about), and one that seeks to build parallels and alternatives to the external networks of the regime through which it tries to acquire and maintain international legitimacy. That is the importance of arranging meetings between dissidents, activists and opposition members and western and international officials.

I have repeatedly argues before that my opposition to the Assad was primarily premised on developmental grounds. That is, had I been convinced, or had the Assads shown that they could help advance the cause of development and modernization of our country, no matter how slowly and gradually, things would have been different. And by launching and operating the Tharwa Project in Syria openly and for years before I was told to leave, and we were forced to go underground of sorts, I have given them the benefit of the doubt. I have also observed how similar more “benign” experiences came to naught. My assertion that the Assads are irreformable was premised neither on theoretical considerations nor isolated happenstances, but on clear evidence.

Most those who argue against opposing the Assads in such clear cut manner, and still argue for reforms from within the regime premise their arguments more on fear of change or lack of societal readiness for change and/or the perceived suitability/unsuitability of current geopolitical conditions in the region, rather than some real conviction in the abilities and legitimacy of the Assads. Pointing out the prevalence of unsuitable characters and movements in the political scene is also used s an argument here. 

The counter argument to all this is simple: societies become ready for change by working for change, and change should be sought by working in tandem on the external and internal fronts, because they are intimately and inextricably connected and through this work geopolitical conditions can be made more amiable for change.

Since this whole enterprise is pretty risky, the ultimate decision to push should be left to the people, meanwhile we have to argue our case in front of them and in front the whole world, and we have to be ready for the time when they might just decide to take the path of confrontation and change in spite of all risks.

As the prevalence of unsavory characters on the political scene, this a frankly something that cannot be helped, and what people need to realize here is that the choice is ultimately not one between opposition and regime, but one between hope and despair. If both the regime and the opposition inspire despair, then to hell with them both, the dynamics of change and social agitation itself will produce new set of leaders that can be far more representatives of the people’s values and expectations. 

Should the people’s choices in this regard prove too conservative to my liberal and heretical taste, and to that of so many segments of the population, well, this is all part of the social learning process. The Syrian people are entitled to experiment with change just like the intellectual, political and military elite of the Baath, Nasserite and other ideological parties have done in the decades following independence.

No, this is not easy to accept or say, but social attitudes cannot change without going through such transitional periods, whether we like it or not. But I believe that if speak of these issues openly beforehand, we do have a fair chance of eliminating the worst case scenarios that we all fear in this regard, and in finding something that is more manageable. Holding on to the status quo for dear life, on the other hand, will only serve to radicalize more and more social strata, thus paving the way for transforming our most dire predictions into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The Heretical Advocate!

In this post, I will respond to some points raised by Alex here. In my next post, I promise to deal with some issues raised by Golaniyah.

Alex, I think the misunderstandings between us are the result in part from:

• you, projecting your own attitudes and/or fears onto me,
• me, because I treated this blog as mixture of a personal space where I sometimes mouth off and vent my own frustration (and when people do that, as you know, they end up, no matter how momentarily, being snobbish and arrogant, - perhaps this what made you think that I am trying to “lead them out”), and at times, I analyze, opinionate and advocate with regard to the Syrian situation, and because this is a personal issue for me, after all, I am a Syrian, anger gets mixed with tactics, and with attempts at objective analysis.

Now that I am slowly getting back to blogging, I will try to separate more carefully the personal from the professional. I don’t think I have the luxury of waxing personal anymore, if I ever had it that is J.

As for you Alex, I think that in your eagerness to advice you came off a bit too patronizing and condescending at many occasions. You always had this mixture of “he’ll soon learn better not to do this,” or “oh my, I really should warn him about those bad people he is hanging around with.” And when, at occasions, I tried to point out to you, and others, not necessarily that I know what I am doing, but that I am aware of the concerns you have and that I have my eyes wide open, and all my senses on full-alert, and that I have my reasons (which I often tried to explain) for wanting to explore some of these controversial avenues, I ended up being branded more or less as a conspirator.

But, the simpler truth is that I am an advocate for a cause, and advocacy is in part about meeting public officials and decision makers, the people who happen to be in office at this stage happen to be Republican and many of them are neocons, so what am I supposed to do, boycott them, because I happen to be at the far end of the liberal spectrum (which by the way I am)? Is that how advocacy works these days?

Would an activist from Greenpeace miss an opportunity to argue his case with the President of the Unites States if he was invited to do so?

Well, come to think of it, I think if the opportunity ever arose, an organization might as well be divided between those who would and those who wouldn’t, for a variety of reasons, ranging from the narcissistic to the ideological and everything in between.

On the other hand, I am quite aware that public officials would agree or would invite an advocate to meet with them both on account of his/her visibility, and for whatever particular interests and calculations they happen to have. That will always be the case. There are no public officials without agendas.

So the choices in front of me Alex are these: meet with the existing officials openly and publicly, not meet with them, or meet with them privately. I have done all three.

In fact, I usually prefer the third alternative. But once I agreed to accept this particular invitation, I knew that there is no way we can keep a lid on this, not for long anyway. Also, there was really no reason for it, on the contrary, it is really very important to put the human rights agenda back on the table, seeing how many people are interested in talking to the regime at this stage. The issue should not be allowed to be forgotten.

Now I know that you would say that this strategy would backfire, and that it is indeed backfiring, but I would like to remind of three things here:

1) the current arrests are clearly not related to the meeting that took place in DC, but the one that took place in Damascus,

2) you are looking at the immediate aftermath of an effort, while I am hoping for a more consistent campaign in this regard,

3) you are conveniently neglecting the nature and history of the regime: the Damascus Spring was fueled by purely internal dynamics, and still the regime saw it as a threat and brought it to a swift end. It is not our activities are putting these people and the cause of reform in danger, it is their activities and the nature of the regime.

I know that “reformers” working from inside the regime claim that we, that is, those who think the regime is irreformable and acting accordingly, are sabotaging their efforts. But I believe that, on the contrary, these elements have only managed to make some little progress and carve a little space for themselves within the regime in the last 2 years, mainly as a result of the regime’s increasing troubles and its attempt to shore up its tattered image in the country and abroad, at a time when opposition groups were getting more organized and more inter-connected and more capable of reaching out to the international community. Once all these pressures are removed though, the “reformers” will face the stark choice of:

* playing within the good old rules,

* leaving the game (and perhaps the country), or

* getting jailed alongside opposition elements on some trumped-up (or real) corruption charge.

A caveat: A lot of people say that 99% of all opposition members are untrustworthy opportunists, by the same token, this can be said of these so-called reformers as well. Sort that out, oh Syrian citizen, wherever you are!

Back to the issue of meeting with officials, two more points need to be made: 

1)      I meet with Democratic and liberal officials all the time, and if I were in the business of promoting myself rather than laying the foundation for a, hopefully, lasting institution, I would be talking about all these meetings continuously.

2)      I am burning in anticipation of hitting the European track soon as well, and over there, I am bound to meet with officials from all stripes, depending on the country and what sort officials its people chose to put in office, and I will lobby for the cause and I will deal with all sorts of criticisms then too. I can count on that I know.

So, why have not traveled to Europe so far? Well, it’s not the lack of contacts there, that’s for sure. But, as some of you might know, despite the fact that I spent 9 years in the US, I had a student visa at the time, I never really got a residency, not to mention a US citizenship. So when I returned to Syria in ’94 I returned as Syrian citizen. And when I was told to leave Syria in 2005, I had to seek political asylum here.

Now my passport has expired, yet I cannot get travel documents from the US until my application for asylum is approved. But with a name like Ammar Abdulhamid, and history with dabbling in Islamic extremism, the background security checks are taking forever. So yes, I can meet with the President of the US, but, I have to wait like everyone else until I am cleared for approval to get my asylum. This is at once what is so great, and awkward, about the system here.

I mean, here I am the head of an American non-profit organization, employing Americans and non-Americans, working with a Board of Director made up of Americans, and I am still in this grey area as far as my legal status is concerned.

Anyway, I hope the situation will come to a resolution this year, no, not on account of my meeting with the President, the system does not work that way, but because enough time has hopefully elapsed since the application was filed. But then, there is always the possibility that this thing could last for years. There is nothing I can do in this regard, it seems, but wait and conspire not to have an ulcer and keep my hemorrhoids in check. Well, here I go discussing personal stuff again J.

As for your following statement Alex:

“Let the people get angry when they feel angry .. let them revolt when they want to take that risk ... let time take care of what is bad in Syria today ... it will... naturally, without leadership and without politics.”

I agree with the first part of this statement, this was the essence of my last interview on al-Hurra, which I unfortunately cannot fid a link to on their site. But I totally disagree about the second part concerning leadership and politics. No change can ever take place without leadership and politics, but I trust that you made your statement in a moment of frustration and with specific people in mind, which is OK. You can disagree with my politics and leadership, and Khaddam’s and Bayanouni’s and Homsi’s and Ghardri’s etc. But change cannot take place without leaders.

Still, and as I said on al-Hurra, people of Syria should not think of change as a choice between the regime and the opposition, they can hate and reject both, and agitate against both. Their very agitation will end up producing the leaders which better represent their aspirations. But there will also be plenty of opportunists, like in all transitional movements.

It is not my hope to be one of those leaders necessarily, what I hope to do is help identify those leaders, or those people with leadership potential, who better represent the values that I believe in, and support them. For they will need it. They will need it. 

A Meeting with the President of the United States

On Tuesday, December 4, 2007, my colleagues former deputy and political prisoner Mamoun al-Homsi, and Kurdish activist Djengizkhan Hasso of the Executive Council of the National Assembly of Kurdistan, and I met with President Bush at the Oval Office. The hour-long meeting was attended by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, National Security Advisor to the Vice President John Hannah, and a number of White House and NSC officials.

The meeting took place upon a special invitation from the White House, and was dedicated to discussing the current state of US-Syria relations.

My colleagues and I went in with a simple message to the President, namely: to bring attention back to the deteriorating situation of human rights in Syria and ask that improvement in this regard be made the main condition for improving bilateral relations.

Our logic in this regard was also simple and straightforward: a regime that cannot establish a normal relation with its people, we argued, should not be allowed to have normal relations with the rest of the world. A regime that continues to abuse, with all the impunity in the world, the basic rights of its people, and that manipulates the electoral processes of the state, violating even its own tailored-to-fit rules and laws in this regard, should not be accepted as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and should not be trusted to enter in good faith into any negotiations with the outside world, no matter what issue is involved. So long as the Syrian regime continues to intimidate its people, hold prisoners of conscience, send dissidents into exile, strip citizens of their nationality (as is the case with over 350,000 Kurds) and detain people without any reasonable cause or justification, it, in effect, compromises its ability to represent the national interests of the country. The Syrian regime should be made to understand that the road to the Golan and the road to both national and international legitimacy ands recognition passes through Damascus, and Aleppo, and Lattakia and other Syrian cities and provinces, and not through Washington, or Tel Aviv. 

In response to our message, the President, who had all the while listened to our presentation quite patiently and attentively, spoke passionately in defense of human rights in Syria and worldwide and revealed in-depth knowledge of developments inside Syria. He praised our work and that of all human rights and democracy activists, and our ongoing campaign to bring world attention to the worsening human rights situation in the country.   

The President agreed that freeing political prisoners and improving the human rights conditions in Syria were and would always be key parts of American policy toward that country.