Tharwalizations

The New World Mayhem

The main hallmark of the emerging World Order is the utter universal lack of capable and inspiring leaders and visions. The complex task of managing a hard yet necessary transitional period in the history of humanity, a coming to terms with our global unity and interdependence and their implications, is left in the hand of mediocre leaders who have neither the prerequisite abilities nor vision nor plans to shape the current unfolding of events and developments. For this, we are bound to continue to stumble on from one seemingly manageable crisis to another and from one all too avoidable war to another until things get completely out of hand and we find ourselves immersed in a global conflict whose tragic consequences are bound to shape our collective memories for millennia to come.

Diversity and Turmoil

Diversity in our region creates certain dynamics that are simply too complex to be tackled through some facile generalizations. In this regard, and while Arabs across the region and the world seem to stand in solidarity with Hezbollah, the Bedouins in Israel seem to have a different opinion on this matter. Indeed, the Bedouins seem to “bitterly resent Hezbollah,” since of its Katyusha rockets tend to fall at them. Also, and contrary to how many Arabs feel with regard to the US, the Bedouins of Israel “don't think the U.S. is engaged in a war against Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and elsewhere. They think Arab anger around the world can be laid at the feet of dictators who spread misinformation to distract people from inept rule.” 

Conversely, many members of the Coptic community in Egypt seem to sympathize with Hezbollah and its cause. According to Bishop Rafic Gris, the spokesman for the Egyptian Catholic Church, “[a]ll Arabs must be proud of Hizbullah's gallantry."

On the other hand, events in Iraq have shown that while one part of the country could lie in shambles, another could be considered as an “example of success.” In this regards, the Intelligencer wonders in reference to Iraqi Kurdistan: “Did you know there is a vast region of Iraq where no U.S. troops have been killed, enemy terrorist activity has been negligible, there are few U.S. troops deployed, it is safe for Westerners to walk the streets, new business investment is taking off and there is a stable, democratic government providing more than adequately for the regions security?” 

Although, one has to note here the seriousness of the growing linguistic divide separating the Kurds form the rest of the Iraqi population.

A somewhat similar situation might be observed in Thailand. For while the southern parts of the country continue to witness an Islamic insurrection fueled in part by the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, Muslim communities in the northern parts of the country, which have a different ethnic and national mix than their southern co-religionists, seem to be well-integrated with the rest of the population.

For their part, the Turkmen of Afghanistan are still having integration problems in the post-Taliban political system, adding another layer of complexity to the fragile situation in the country.

The problems of the Indonesian province of Aceh, on the other hand, have been further complicated when the provincial government adopted Sharia Law as the official law of the land. Indeed, this article in NY Times notes: “[a]cross this most religious of Indonesia’s provinces, brown uniformed policemen in black wagons enforce Shariah, or Islamic law. They haul unmarried couples into precincts and arrest people for drinking or gambling. Increasingly, many of the cases are pushed to the ultimate conclusion, public canings at mosques in front of pumped-up crowds.”

So, and as the region continues to struggle with the problems emanating from its diversity, its ongoing identity crisis, the aftershocks of the introduction of modernity into its folds, and fro deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and foreign dabbling, turmoil rather than wealth is the only thing that the region seems to be capable of generating at this stage. How long this will last depends heavily on the ability of the various peoples of the region to develop more pragmatic approaches to governance, development and “national priorities.” Indeed, a long-term vision for the development of the region, coupled with the necessary political will, is needed in order to prevent its continuing implosion.

Democratize but Stabilize

No one can any longer deny that there is a real and serious need for a concerted well-coordinated multilateral approach to the processes of development, modernization and democratization in the Broader Middle Eat and North Africa Region. Quick fixes are indeed impossible, but a need to shake the status quo is, nonetheless, quite urgent. If the UNDP reports of 2002-4 have served to elucidate anything, it is the necessity of drastic changes in policies in the region, but few of the existing leaders seem willing and/or capable of this. National interest considerations are not at stake here for them, it is their parochial interests, and, in typical cynical human fashion, they tend to override all other considerations.

And there is the rub: if some regimes in the region are not pushed into change, they will not willingly adopt it, and if there were pushed, they will more likely try to bunker down and challenge the world, no matter how foolish the challenge might seem. What the right course of action is in this case is anyone’s guess really. But one thing is clear, the UNDP reports paint a very dark picture of the present and foretells a future with many failed states in the region as a result of lack of the serious lack of development. And the region is just too central and too vital to be left to rot.

A few thoughts on modernity

Many if not most of the main problems facing us in the region and hindering the process of change and modernization therein are psychological in nature. One such problem is the inability of our people to reconcile themselves with the necessity of making that crossover from the traditional to the modern. Instead, most seem to believe that they can keep one leg in each world thus maximizing their benefit, that is, they think that they can avail themselves of all that advantages that modernity has to offer while holding on as hard as they can to traditional values.

Often, this dilemma boils down to a desire to get all the technology but change nothing of the customs, values and mannerisms. Some might go a little further and opt to adopt certain superficial aspects of modernity, such as the modern dress-code for both men and women, but while adhering to the selfsame value system that any run-of-mill Islamist will adhere to, such as arranged marriages and many of the usual restrictions on women, especially with regard to inheritance and chastity. 

This inability to make the break with the past and move forward that has plagued our part of the world for the last century or so is precisely why our societies are now poised at the verge of a complete relapse into pre-modern modes of existence. We have not earned what modernity has to offer, because, one, we have not taken an active part in making for centuries, and, two, because we refuse to embrace it as a whole, on account of its “glaring” imperfections.

Indeed, modernity is not perfect, what human product is? But it also cannot be perfected by people who insist on remaining outside it, or who are not wholeheartedly committed to it, or who continue to look at it with a certain disdain, it being a “foreign” product and all that, and who continue to reject its essence: the insistence on individuality and individual rights.

Indeed, if people in our region can only accept that concept of individual rights, then, each one of them becomes free to create the particular mixture of modernity and traditionalism that best suits the quirks of his/her mind and soul. For a wholehearted embracing of modernity is not synonymous with a complete rejection of everything that traditional values have to offer. On the contrary, it simply gives the individual the right to construct the values system that best suits him/her and to act on that so long as the basic human rights of others are respected. This embedded ambivalence of modernity is what makes it better than traditional value systems with their claims to divine sanctions and inability to tolerate “heretical” views.

But this ambivalence is also modernity’s weak point, one that is often exploited by Islamists, and other fundamentalists, who would protest loudly against any infringements against their basic human rights, while simultaneously and quite knowingly preaching a message that, in effect, denies others their basic human rights.

Be that as it may, every system does have weak points, and the best way to protect the modern system from its main weak point is through vigilance. The temptation to resort to intimidation and establishing legal restrictions on basic freedoms, such as free speech and the freedom of assembly is nothing less than foolish as it will eventually serve to undermine the very system we are trying to protect.

Asking all the wrong questions

Ever since the Danish Cartoon Controversy, a spate of alarmist articles and reports on Islam and the Muslim communities in western societies appeared in various newspapers and journals across the world, all warning against the danger posed by Islam as such and all asserting that Islam as a faith is inherently violence.

But, and while I do not dispute the existence of a problem related to a clash between the values espoused by traditional faiths and those advocated by modernity, I find it too simplistic, nonetheless, to make such absurd claims. For like all other traditional faith systems out there, Islamic teachings and holy texts have throughout history lent themselves equally to the pursuit of peace and happiness as to the waging of war against the infidels and the heretics.

As such, the real questions in font of us is not whether Islam is a religion of peace or not, and not whether Europe is being Islamicized through an invasion of hordes of Muslim immigrants, rather the real questions should focus on the nature of the mechanisms that need to be employed for modernizing Muslim societies and of integration Muslims into the fabric of modern existence. The questions should also deal with the various variants of transitional arrangements that need to be involved here.

There are no easy answers here, of course, but that’s in itself a demonstration of the relevance and correctness of the questions being posed. The questions referred to above, on the other hand, can lead to the very simple conclusion regarding the inevitability and necessity of conflict, with all the compromises conflicts usually entail with regards to respect of the basic human rights of the perceived “enemies.”

Syria and the Fallacies of the China Model

Witnessing the reintroduction of the China Model into the scene of the political discouse surrounding Syria's future comes as quite an alarming developmet. The Model was first introduced into the country’s political discourse in early 2000 by some Baath and other leftwing ideologues, but now it is being reintroduced by American right- and leftwing commentators seeking to further their anti-neocon diatribe, or avert blame over the worsening situation in Iraq – after all, it is never too early to begin campaigning for the next elections on behalf of your favorite party. 

For, in essence, the Chinese Model is nothing more than a new way for avoiding dealing with the real issue at hand, namely that of ME inborn resilience and resistance to change.

As a concept, the Chinese Model puts economic change and administrative reforms first on the reform agenda in a given country, while postponing the issue of political change to an undisclosed future date. In a country like China, with its 1.2 billion people, this system still leaves us with a 2 million plus ruling elite and a corresponding complex decision-making process that opens some room for some sort of debate to take place, a debate in which quite a few capable minds are involved. As such, there is an off chance here that this Model can indeed work, for China.

but, and within the context of a country like Syria, a country already bled dry of all major brain power and most of its creative minds, the Chinese Model can oly serve to preserve the existing system of sectario-political oppression, and can only pave the way to the type of economic liberalism that can only serve the monopolistic interests of the brothers, brother-in-laws, cousins and other party members and comrades-in-arms. The society, meanwhile, has no other option but to descend into an atavistic hell.

Indeed, this is the unavoidable effect of globalization on small states with an inherently illiberal and authoritarian political culture, a corrupt ruling elite, and populations that, in the absence of good and modern educational systems, continue to be quite susceptible to the mesmerizing allure of a messianic medievalistic ideology.

But change in the region is a must. And change in Syria is now unavoidable. For the processes of its disintegration has already been set in motion, by rulers and external powers alike. To cop out on the responsibilities emanating from this now is not only cowardly, but unwise. If another sectarian mayhem is to be averted, change in the country needs to be properly facilitated and managed, and a anew social contract of sorts that can rebind the country’s various ethnic and confessional groups together needs to be introduced.

Shying away from these responsibilities will only serve to delay what has already been made inevitable, at an almost deliberate pace, and will only make the eventual implosion worse for the entire region, with ramifications that will likely be felt in many other parts of the world. Indeed, failure to intervene at the right time is often more catastrophic than mismanaging the intervention itself, albeit both are equally undesirable.

Managing our way through! – A few thoughts on the nature of our current dilemma

Interest, principle, reality and time. What do we do when all these things conflict, and begin to push and pull us in different directions? How can we manage the crises that emanate from the complex interactions of these basic facts of our daily subsistence, our historical journey, our ongoing quest to know who we are, our continuing experimentation with the fabric of life and existence, in a desperate attempt at self-actuation and self-actualization?

There are no easy answers here of course, especially within the context of Middle East politics.

Still, and on the intellectual level, the conflict under consideration and within the context of contemporary ME politics, often manifests itself as a heated debate, rife with the usual sonorous speechifying and the mutual verbal vilifications that tend to characterize existentialist, or to be more specific existentializing, if not even self-existentializing, polemics, between those who would like to think of themselves as “pragmatists,” if not “realists,” and those who may not mind at all being described as “ideologues,” although, personally, each one of them would rather reserve the term “visionary” for him/herself.

Within the context of contemporary ME politics, and ever since the tragic events of 9/11, and increasingly since the US-led invasion of Iraq, the pragmatists seem to advocate engaging unruly regimes and movements, including the Syrian and Iranian regimes and the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, offering them a nice assortment of big juicy carrots in order to secure their compliance on certain key issues, this in the hope of avoiding a repeat of an Iraq-style scenario, one for which the final chapter should also be written soon and almost regardless of the potential fallouts on the internal situation in that country.

For indeed, the pragmatists advocate steering the course of policymaking away from any kind of open-ended involvement in the internal affairs of ME countries, where the dynamics are always too obscure and unpredictable and where the political and social situation always all too fragile.

The ideologues, on the other hand, contend that what the pragmatists have been advocating has already been tried for decades and has so far failed in generating the “right” kind of dynamism that can help incorporate the region into the more developed part of the world as docile client states, for this status represents the best that both camps, that is, the ideologues and the pragmatists, are willing to offer these states.

Be that as it may, and while the failure to draw these states into the desired relation-type cannot be solely blamed on the policies of the developed states, the policies themselves did not, nonetheless, require major review and overhaul, if not reversal. This led the ideologues to adopt a more interventionist, assertive and downright belligerent approach to the region as a whole, even vis-à-vis some of their staunchest allies, including Saudi Arabia which had produced most of the 9/11 terrorists.

The failure to incorporate the ME states (an argument that applies to the Broader Middle East and North Africa Region) into the desired system was not only due to the nature of the policies adopted by the developed states, even with regard to their policies regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Nor was it related to the refusal of the existing regimes to have their states incorporated as client states per se. Nor do worsening economic conditions represent a sufficient condition in this regard.

At the core of the rejectionist tendencies we currently witness in the region, with all its manifestations, from the mere increase in social conservatism and religiosity to clear cut terrorist practices and attacks, is a psychological-cultural ethos that posits one form of messianism and Manifest Destiny against another. Islam has always been a missionary faith, and the Muslim worldview has always placed the Ummah at the cosmic center. For the Muslims to be located at the margins of things these days, for them to be on the receiving end of a condescending treatment and worldview, no matter how justifiably so in practical terms (ethical and moral considerations aside, for this whole matter, recourse to moralization by all sides notwithstanding, has always been more about power relations and politics than anything else), is something that all too simply unacceptable. 

But since a more positive and proactive approach to rejection requires a more thorough reevaluation of the basic tenets of the Islamic worldview and its traditional assumptions, not to mention a more serious confrontation with the agents of sociopolitical authoritarianism in the countries involved, opting for the more passive path of increased religiosity while showing clear sympathies with the more extremist and radical currents was the safest and easiest choice.

Meanwhile, the more “bold” and “adventurous” elements seem to have found a more appealing, as it is indeed self-deluding, alternative in asserting a more purist and ahistorical version of the faith using it as the basic drive for confronting those “usurpers” of one’s rightful place under the sun.

Looking at things from this perspective, neither the pragmatists nor the ideologues can be judged as being completely wrong. Intervention is a must – the region needs it, and the world needs it. Left to its own devices, there is enough inertia in the region to withstand all internal pressures for change, development and modernization for a very long time.

But the world is not going to wait for it to change at its own pace. The processes of globalization have long unleashed themselves upon us, and they are too blind. But the powers that be in this world are not, and although, these forces tend to generate problems (in the form of atavistic reactions, among other things) in their societies as well, they are still better positioned to manage these forces to their advantage.

As for the legitimacy of seeking to assign a client status on most countries in the ME, frankly, and moralizations aside, states can only be incorporated on the basis of their level of development. And yes, the more developed states are not going to be so wholly supportive of underdeveloped states’ drive to improve their lot in this world, if this is going to clash with their interests, somehow. For why should they step up rivals for themselves? In fact, how could they do that? Their political systems and electoral processes are bound to produce governments that are meant to seek the best possible arrangements for their electorate and lobbyists. As such, the policies that these states are bound to adopt most of the time will not be guided by a sense of enlightened self-interest, but by immediate interests of the most powerful and effective lobbies involved.

In a sense then, the entire game is rigged against “us,” the peoples of the Middle East, and it is getting more and more rigged against us all the time. So, and whether we like it or not, we need to push for breaking the current stalemate, albeit through the auspices of external powers, and albeit the immediate and even intermediate consequences are more likely to be troubling than positive. This is why the “ideologues” in the developed camp seem to be our best allies at this stage, while the ideologues in our midst are our worst enemies.

Throughout all of this, crisis management is the best skill we need to acquire.

Muslim reformers need to shout

In their first women conference in Hyderabad, India, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind president Dr. Mohammed Abdul Haq Ansari asserted that, “[i]n the name of liberty, women are being sexually exploited and misused for promotion of brands. But reality is that dogs are given better treatment than women in the western countries.”

These are some very powerful words indeed. Unfortunately, we rarely hear such powerful condemnations against women abuse practiced in Muslim societies. Our sharpest criticisms are always reserved for the West, while we tend to whitewash and deny our own problems no matter how serious they happen to be. In fact, we often tend to blame our most serious problems on the West as well.

Islamic radicalism, for instance, and according to former Iranian President, Muhammad Khatami, is the product of a “self-centred” West that is “determined to see the entire world adopt its values.”

But, and to give Mr. Khatami some credit, he does acknowledge that the “violence and extremism” we see in parts of the Islamic world seem to stem from “their backwardness and a feeling of humiliation, making understanding and compromise all the more difficult.”

Still, and unless we are ready to acknowledge that this backwardness comes as an indication that Islam itself is perfectible and that Muslims don’t have a monopoly on knowledge, even in matters pertaining to spirituality and ethical/moral behavior, and unless we are willing to tackle the specific details involved in such acknowledgements, legitimizing all the while the different approaches and interpretations that are bound to emerge as a result of this exercise, such general admissions of culpability are hardly enough to stem the rising tide of radicalism and enable our societies to rise up to the level of developmental challenges posed by modernity. 

Hiding behind the insistence on our cultural specificity by making such transparent statements and assertions as the ones made recently by Mr. Eyad Madani, Saudi Minister of Culture and Information, in the opening moments of the Jeddah Economic Forum, when he noted that "[o]ur approach isn't to call for feminism, but rather femininity," is foolish to an extreme, as everybody knows by now invoking the argument pertaining to cultural specificity is consistently used to justify the curtailing of certain basic and well-established human right. In this case, the issue was unsurprisingly that of the status of women in Saudi society.

Still, Mr. Madani did stir up a controversy when he asserted that there "is nothing in the written laws of the country that prohibits women from applying for a driver's license,” and then urged “would-be Saudi women drivers to try to overturn the ban,” often imposed by the local authorities in the Kingdom.

But such minor assertions are hardly enough to balance things up in a part of the world that insists on reliving the crusades. Unless Muslims reformers become more willing to join the intellectual battle against the extremists in their own societies, the talibanization of our part of the world will be made inevitable.

The New Rushdiesque!

Indeed, it is happening again: protests and condemnations giving way to riots, arson and pandemonium. Just as Khomeini needed to use the Rushdie Affair to stoke the dying fires of his revolution, so now are the myriad Arab dictatorships, most notably the Syrian one, using an, at worst, unwise decision by a Danish publisher to rally the masses to the cause and divert their people’s attention, no matter how momentarily, from their corrupt authoritarian and inept rule. Indeed, a new Rushdiesque is unfolding, albeit a rather mediocre one. For Arab rulers cannot produce but mediocrity. The scenes in Damascus and Beirut are but a simple testament to this little macabre truth.

See in this regard as well the blogposts by Tabsir, Llano Estacado, Mental Mayhem and Religious policeman. 

Breaking the Stalemate!

The various “color” and “flower” revolutions that have been taken place around the globe recently, in places like Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, seems to be intricately connected to the workings of various American international NGOs. Moreover, the activities of these NGOs seem to reflect in many ways certain shifts in the US foreign policy and interests, and, in turn, the success or failure of the various revolutions seems to reflect these shifts as well. This is why the political convulsions of Uzbekistan (May 2005) and Azerbaijan (November 2005), for instance, did not result in such revolutions.

This is the essence of the analysis presented by Sreeram Chaulia in the recent article “Democratisation, NGOs and "colour revolutions.” The points made in the article are neither new nor surprising; this also applies to the tone of indignation involved in the analysis. Still, the article does flesh out the current context of the “third wave” of democratization currently sweeping across the globe.  

But, and as usual in such analysis, the article fails to point out the lack of viable and realistic alternatives to the peoples in the countries under consideration. Caught between authoritarian regimes and imploding societies, with continuous dabbling by external powers in their internal affairs, the choices that civil society groups and opposition movements in these countries have tend to be pretty limited. In fact, the situation boils down to having to make a choice between breaking the political and socioeconomic stalemate in cooperation with external powers, or settling for more of the same under the existing inept regimes. 

A search for a third alternative seems to be the prerogative of large states such as China and India, or coalition of states, such as the ASEAN countries, not of dismembered entities ruled by corrupt authoritarian and inept regimes that seem to be completely cut off from the rapidly ever changing realities around them.

Indeed, some countries seem to be jumping too late on the bandwagon of modernization and development, and at a time when foreign dabbling continues to be a fact of everyday life. Whatever the reasons for this delay, the fact of it limits their choices. Unless they could together a la ASEAN and empower themselves through some kind of regional economic and political cooperation and joint security arrangements, a development that is quite unlikely under existing leaderships, the only realistic choices that opposition movements seem to have tend to involve some substantive degree of support and coordination with foreign powers, in particular, the United States.

Moreover, one of the major factors that seem to have facilitated acceptance of this alternative by the opposition movements in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus must be the lack of popular anti-American feelings in the countries involved, unlike the situation in the Middle East, where anti-Americanism runs deep in people’s souls, for a variety of reasons, including past support for dictatorial regimes and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 

Showing indignation vis-à-vis American imperialist dabbling in other people’s affairs is the prerogative of peoples and countries that have at least achieved a certain degree of modernization and seems capable of being able to guide such a process forward for the foreseeable future. This is not the situation in the Middle East. Indignation has no role to play here. A heavy dose of pragmatism and Real Politick will do much better instead, not only in dealing with the US and the EU, but also in dealing with the internal ethnic, religious and ideological diversity that shapes the lives of most countries in the region.

People often preach real politick at the United States, but they fail to see that real politick considerations are the main driving force behind the choices that some opposition movements in the countries involved are making. The movements are aware of the intentions of the US, but they are also aware of the necessity of breaking through the stalemate.